Religion, Faith, Fundamentalism

An exploration of supposed antitheses and unexpected partners by Jason Davies-Kildea

Religious belief is not a threat to reason, nor is faith to truth, the essential problem derives from fundamentalism and the violence associated with the closing of the mind.

Introduction

This essay will focus on an exploration of three relationships: religion and reason; faith and truth; fundamentalism and violence.  Essentially what needs to be considered is whether these first two pairs are antithetical and if the last couplet is inextricably linked.  Are religious belief and rational thinking sworn enemies in the modern era?  Is faith believing what you know isn’t true?  In what ways can fundamentalism be said to close the mind?  Does this necessarily result in violence?  These are the kinds of queries that will be explored throughout this essay.

After establishing the scope of concern and necessary definitions, each of the three relationships will be explored in turn.  Prior to concluding, it will also be asked whether there are any valid alternatives to fundamentalism that might be able to redeem religion in the twenty first century.  What might these look like and how can they survive a time of rapid change, scientific and technological advance?  The results of this exploration will demonstrate that fundamentalism, not religion or faith per se, is particularly problematic because it facilitates both prejudice and violence.

Scope and Definitions

The subject of fundamentalism was for a long time little more than a social curiosity and perhaps something of an embarrassment to religious intellectuals.  However, the events of 9/11 have ushered in a new era of concern.  Religious fundamentalism is now being taken very seriously and has become the subject of a multitude of sociological, psychological and theological studies.

Fundamentalist-type behaviours are not new and can be identified throughout religious history (Armstrong, 2000); (Ali, 2002) ; (Cameron, 1995, p. 5).  However, the term fundamentalism was originally coined to describe a movement within Christianity in the early 20th century.  There are now fundamentalist elements that have been recognised in most major religions[1].  In addition, the term ‘fundamentalist‘ has been expanded in common usage to be applied outside purely religious dimensions so that one can be a Market, Political or Nationalist fundamentalist (Sim, 2004).  This expansion of meaning has made the task of defining fundamentalism increasingly difficult.

The first fundamentalists published a series of pamphlets entitled ‘The Fundamentals’ (from which they got their name) in response to what they saw as a dilution of the Christian faith by liberal theologians.  They deemed belief in the following dogma to be essential:

the inerrancy of Scripture

1. the Virgin Birth of Christ
2. Christ’s atonement for our sins on the cross
3. his bodily resurrection, and
4. the objective reality of his miracles(Armstrong, 2000, p. 171).

Christian fundamentalists might still describe themselves in the same way, partly because looking back to a more glorious and honourable past is a feature of fundamentalism, however outside commentators are using different descriptors.  Altemeyer (2003, p. 17) argues that contemporary usage of the term is significantly more broad, reflecting the way people believe as much as what they believe.  He describes fundamentalism now as being ‘not so much a set of particular religious beliefs as an attitude toward whatever beliefs one held - for example, that they contain the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity.’  Such an attitude to truth is invariably divisive, as claims to absolute truth dictate those who are wrong and those who are right; an in and out group whose consequences are heightened by the belief that membership defines one’s eternal destiny.

Religious fundamentalism is now also recognised more by its reactionary nature, particularly in the face of scientific advance and modernism, than by adherence to particular doctrines.  It is often just as easy to define what fundamentalists are against (e.g. homosexuality, abortion, pluralism) as it is to say what they are for (e.g. rigid moral standards, scriptural literalism, adherence to authority).  According to Cameron (1995, pp. 7,9), fundamentalism’s defining characteristics include ‘hostility to freedom, truth, and dissent; and an insistence on authority, obedience, conformity, and indoctrination.’  The correlations listed here are not accidental.  The fundamentalist’s insistence on authority is directly related to their discomfort with dissent, just as their emphasis on conformity leaves little room for individual freedom.

Vorster (2007, p. 11) has a more specific, but equally confronting list including:

• scripturalism,
• the attempt to establish a rigid orthopraxis,
• the identification of a common enemy,
• anger,
• totalism,
• religious fanaticism and extremism.

The concept of scripturalism, which denotes a specific set of attitudes to religious writings including inerrancy and infallibility, is a control mechanism used to establish authority.[2] This authority extends beyond moral and ethical standards to include all areas of life (totalism).  It is this all-encompassing quality of fundamentalism, combined with a conviction that they alone have access to divine truth, that creates an environment susceptible to extremism.

For the purposes of this essay, however, it is the combative nature of modern fundamentalism that is of particular interest.  In a later work (2008, p. 44), Vorster notes that the term ‘fundamentalism‘ is now ‘used to describe a certain form of religious belief which is characterised by extremism and an inclination to violence.’  This is typical of definitions that have arisen in the first decade of the twenty-first century.  Whereas a century ago the key issue was dogma, the most recognisable characteristics of the modern fundamentalist are prejudice and violence.  That fundamentalists have become known for the consequences of their belief system rather than its contents supports the argument that the way we believe is more significant in this case than what we believe.  It is with this in mind that we now move on to examine our first paired association.

Religion and Reason

A cursory reading of the ‘New Atheists’[3] might suggest that religious belief and rational thinking have always been archenemies.  Religion is portrayed as irrational and rooted in fantasy, compared with science which sees itself as the chief proponent of rationality.  Yet for many centuries some of the best thinkers in the Western world gravitated towards the Church because theological study was held in such high esteem.  The Enlightenment certainly confronted the kind of religion that refused to ask questions or be challenged, however many great philosophers and scientists have been deeply religious people who saw no conflict between a belief in God and rational thought.  For instance, Galileo said ‘I do not feel obliged to believe that the same God who has endowed us with sense, reason, and intellect has intended us to forgo their use.’[4] At the height of the Enlightenment, John Wesley the founder of Methodism, recommended a fourfold hermeneutic principle involving Scripture, Tradition, Experience and Reason - the Wesleyan Quadrilateral.  His method of theological reflection ensured that extremist views in each dimension were countered and balanced accordingly.  The English philosopher John Locke also wrote a treatise entitled ‘The Reasonableness of Christianity’.  So it may be seen that religion and reason have in fact worked closely together for much longer than they have been claimed to be in opposition.

‘Berger (1969:115) has plausibly argued that the rationality of the West has Jewish and Christian roots’ (cited in Bruce, 2008, p.22).  He claims that both religions were ‘rationalising forces’ that created the precedents by which they would both later come under attack.  Yet neither reason, nor its natural descendant science, is the natural enemy of religion that some antagonists would now claim.

Gould has argued that science and religion are not inherently conflictual due to a foundational distinction in purpose.  ‘The lack of conflict between science and religion arises from a lack of overlap between their respective domains of professional expertise - science in the empirical constitution of the universe, and religion in the search for proper ethical values and the spiritual meaning of our lives.’ (Gould et al., 2007, p. 592)  This basic distinction he designates as the NOMA or ‘non-overlapping magisteria’ principle.  Many scientists and theologians appear to be content with this differentiation.  The Bible should not be used to evaluate the authenticity of the ‘Big Bang’ theory or be expected to reveal the secrets of quantum physics.  Such anachronistic challenges are only problematic for fundamentalists who believe their scriptures to be the only source of all truth.

Dawkins (2006, p. 80) disagrees not only as to whether theology is capable of answering the ‘why’ questions of existence, but even whether the authenticity of a ‘why’ question is valid at all.  Such denial flies in the face of countless theological and philosophical thinkers that have managed to both challenge and inspire people for millennia.  Whilst it seems unlikely that any single religious expression might be able to answer universally and eternally the deepest questions of human existence, to suggest that such questions do not even exist is preposterous.

Religion and reason share a long history, which despite recent arguments to the contrary, has often demonstrated a capacity for mutual benefit.  The rational approach of science is not the enemy of religion, but offers complementary insights that contribute to a wider understanding of life’s most significant questions.  As in any other field, it is primarily the nature of our questions that determines where we are most likely to source a relevant answer.  Just as we might not begin with a musician to seek answers to mathematics, or a chef to diagnose what is wrong with our car, we can recognise the relative strengths of religion and science, both of which may be underpinned by rational thinking.

Having recognised the commonalities and differences in the respective domains of religion and scientific rationalism, we now turn to an even more fundamental question - how do we know what we know?

Faith and Truth

Our understanding of the relationship between faith and truth relates strongly to our views on relativism and insight into our own personal subjectivity.  For the fundamentalist, faith and truth are not in conflict because they believe that they have access to absolute truth through the lens of faith.  Divinely revealed truth, according to the fundamentalist, therefore supersedes that of science whenever they appear to conflict; thus creationism trumps evolution because the Bible is the ultimate authority above and beyond any evidence that science might proffer.

According to Vorster, the importance of ‘knowing the truth‘ to fundamentalists is a direct response to the impact of a rapidly changing world.  He states that fundamentalists ‘find solace in anchoring their lives in a few self-identified truths.  These truths are seen as absolutes and they become the unchangeable framework within which their world and life view are formulated’(2007, p. 15).  So, not only do fundamentalists see themselves as having access to absolute truth but also these truths are, by their very nature, beyond the scope of challenge.

It is this kind of thinking has led to the popular notion that ‘faith is believing in that which you know isn’t really true‘.  Fundamentalists are determined to believe a range of dogmatic propositions that appear to contradict all empirical evidence.  The modern secularist has been so influenced by such fundamentalist attitudes that the concept of religious faith now appears to be in direct opposition to scientific truth.  The polarisation of these concepts is the result of a narrow understanding of both truth and faith.

The nature of truth and how we have access to truth is a major theme of the subject of epistemology, the study of knowledge.[5] A key question is whether there is such a thing as absolute truth, and if so can we apprehend it, or is all truth ultimately relative?  Both fundamentalists and their key detractors seem to believe in the possibility of specific absolutes, even if the content of those absolutes differs substantially.  Dawkins (2006, p. 319) dismisses his opposition when he says that even ‘those infected with ‘cultural relativism’ … believe in evidence in our own lives, whatever we may profess… If I am accused of murder…I cannot get away with the philosophical evasion: ‘It depends what you mean by ‘true’.”  What Dawkins fails to adequately address is whether the same methodology applied in forensic investigations is really sufficient for such quests as philosophical enquiry.

Dawkins’ viewpoint illustrates the restrictions of the scientific positivist and post-positivist epistemological frameworks: they only work for subjects that can be empirically proven.  However, not all aspects of life are subject to empirical examination.  Human beings largely interpret their world through the lens of their own experience and this inevitably creates significant relativities.  The constructivist paradigm addresses some of the inherent limitations of a positivist framework for such enterprises.  Constructivism recognises a relativist ontology - people exist in a variety of personal and social constructs defined by culture and experience.  Our understanding of the world in which we live, and our part in this world, is inevitably shaped by the concrete experiences that continually define our own life situation.  According to Guba and Lincoln (1998, p. 206), in a constructivist framework, ‘Realities are apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature.’  This understanding of the multiplicity of realities which people experience is readily understood in the post-modern, relativist framework common to many people today.

Constructivism inherently acknowledges different viewpoints without automatically assuming that only one view can be ‘right’ (dismissing the other), nor that apparently competing views must be converged in some way.  This is particularly helpful when it is necessary to hold in tension the partial understandings of science and religion, where neither is able to fully account for or address the question.  All claims to truth are ultimately provisional and subject to challenge by both advances in knowledge over time and cultural adaptation.

So what is faith and how does it relate to a relativist understanding of truth?  Firstly, faith is not the same as belief - and belief shouldn’t mean a relenting mental assent to something that defies one’s experience.  One of the most influential theologians of the twentieth century, defines faith quite differently:

‘The biblical word for existence is ‘faith’… Faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern. And, since only that which is the ground of our being and meaning should concern us ultimately, we can also say: Faith is the concern about our existence in its ultimate ‘whence’ and ‘whither’.  It is a concern of the whole person; it is the most personal concern and that which determines all others.  It is not something that can be forced upon us; it is not something which we can produce by the will to believe, but that by which we are grasped.’ (Tillich, 1955, pp. 51-52)

According to Tillich, and the many who have followed his lead, the core role of faith relates to exploring the deepest questions of our existence.  These questions are unlikely to be answered with pre-prepared ‘one size fits all’ solutions.  In fact addressing them is as much a matter of action, of living in ways that find fulfilment and meaning, as it is of understanding or intellectualising certain responses.  Tillich admits that such a re-conception ‘has little to do with the popular concepts of faith as the belief in something unbelievable, as the subjection to an authority in which we trust, or as the risk of accepting something as highly probable but not certain’(1955, p. 52).  It does, however, provide an alternative to the narrow fundamentalist understanding that limits faith to belief in a set of theological propositions.

A wider conception of faith also has the potential to break open the us/them dichotomy, created between denominations and religions, which is the inevitable result of competing claims to absolute truth.  It is when faith is narrowly defined and made exclusive to particular religious traditions that competition and sometimes even a combative stance between religions results.  It is this relationship between fundamentalism and violence to which we now turn.

Fundamentalism and Violence

How have fundamentalism and violence become associated with one another?

If the problems associated with fundamentalism were restricted to the theological dimensions, then it would cause little concern outside of religious circles.  It has however become of increasing concern that fundamentalism seems to be closely linked with violence.  Whilst it cannot be claimed that all fundamentalists are inherently violent, the divisive nature of fundamentalism does create an in/out group dynamic and from this arises a continuum of responses from prejudice to physical violence.  Fundamentalism therefore, by its very nature, creates the conditions for extremist interpretations that include violence as an acceptable, even ‘God-authorised’ activity.

Armstrong, who has studied the subject of Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, claims that the fundamentalist mentality is:

‘rooted in fear, convinced that the secular, liberal establishment wants to wipe out religion.  Each movement has developed in a symbiotic relationship with a modernity and secularism that is experienced as invasive and aggressive.  The more fundamentalists are attacked, the more extreme they become, because the assault convinces them that they are correct in their assumption, and that the modern world truly wants to annihilate them and their religion’ (2004, p. 875).

This essentially reactionary attitude sets up a confrontational dynamic right from the very beginning.  The dynamic is expressed from the fundamentalist’s point of view as representative of the cosmic battle between good and evil.  Those who are on the side of the fundamentalists are good and everyone else is therefore evil.

Furthermore, fundamentalism thrives on the identification and vilification of its enemies.  Vorster indicates this when he says that fundamentalism is ‘well-known for its creation of ‘bogies’ that are put forward as the archenemies of the social and moral order.  In Christian fundamentalism, ‘liberalism’, ‘modernism’ and ‘post-modernism’ are such bogies.  In Islamic fundamentalism they are the ‘infidels’, the ‘Americanism’ and the ‘West’ in general’ (2008, p. 52).  Fundamentalisms thrive in the trenches of ideological warfare utilising this militant perspective to generate fear and consolidate alliances.

What is particularly disturbing about the battleground that fundamentalists have created is the unquestioning clarity in which people, morality and even ideals are drawn as white or black; good or evil; with God or against God.  Though failing to adequately take into account the real complexities of life, this apparent simplicity draws upon deep psychological archetypes that see the world in a battle between good and evil.  According to Ellens (2004, p. 3), this polarisation greases the slope towards violence:  ‘If the world is a stage for the cosmic battle between good and evil, God and devil, mediated through human agency, humans who want to undertake what they consider responsible courses of action are likely to resort to violence to win the war for God and the good. Each highly motivated religionist conceives of his or her religio-cultural stance to be the one that is on God’s side.’  Violence that is perpetrated against evil is legitimised because the perpetrators know themselves to be on the side of good.

The other side is literally ‘demonised’, as they are described as being on the side of evil, of Satan, perhaps even being under the influence of actual demons.  At the same time, the fundamentalists know themselves to be working for a sacred cause that has promised them divine blessing, if not in this life then in the afterlife. Like it or not, this kind of strategy has proven effective and continues to see the recruitment of warriors on the side of God (Meyers, 2006, p. 66).

Historically, military propaganda intended to demonise the enemy has justified wars and bolstered soldiers’ wills as they headed into battle.  Meyers (2006, p. 20) demonstrates how prejudicial religious language has been used in US politics to great effect:  ‘By constantly using the word evil, Bush is only doing what fundamentalists of every stripe have done for centuries - demonising first what you can exterminate later.  If you can turn the Prince of Peace into a warrior and preach that your chosen war for the chosen people is approved by God in order to protect a chosen way of life, then you can justify all wars.’  By vilifying the ‘other’, fundamentalists draw on an attractive simplicity, bring together those on God’s side and create conditions that condone violence against an identified enemy.

In what ways does fundamentalism ‘close the mind’?

It is sometimes tempting to assume that fundamentalists are weak-minded people who perhaps lack either the education or intellectual vigour to challenge the dominant mindset of their internal culture.  It could certainly be said that fundamentalism in many ways is much more accessible to people of all intellects and educational backgrounds because followers are told what to think rather than having to figure it out for themselves.  Fundamentalists already have the answers, so the questions and process of figuring them out have become rather redundant.

However, not all fundamentalists are intellectually challenged - they simply choose to divert their intellectual energies towards bolstering arguments for sustaining their own existing positions.  The homogeneity of thought and praxis created gives strength to the fundamentalist cause.  Barr (1984, p. 54) gives some examples of how this happens ‘Taboos on various forms of life-style are common; similarly rife, but more pernicious, are restrictions on the exchange of ideas: only certain books or magazines should be read, conversation with otherwise-thinking Christians is restrained, the support of this or that organisation is insisted upon.’  This conformity is essential to sustaining a strong subculture set against the rest of society.

The fundamentalist sub-culture is cultivated and maintained through their own alternative social and organisational structures including networks of ’societies, institutions, colleges, periodicals, newspapers, research centres, and so on.  All of this is organised so as to provide the maximum resistance to the entry of any non-evangelical and non-fundamentalist opinion’ (Barr, 1980, p. 89).  Fundamentalists are encouraged to listen to specific music, to read certain books, watch particular movies and television shows, and even ensure that they marry those of the same faith.  All of this contributes to strengthening the faithful in the language, rhetoric and philosophical frames of their social and religious sub-group.

Pluralism and open dialogue are anathema to fundamentalists who ‘love a bully pulpit but hate a roundtable.  Why share power when you are right and everyone else is wrong?  Who needs dialogue when your monologue is sacrosanct?’(Meyers, 2006, p. 23) Fundamentalism succeeds in closing the mind by strategically encouraging homogeneity of thought, institutionalising set ways of thinking and discouraging open questioning and dissent.

Fundamentalism and Prejudice - the In and Out groups

The result of a consistent emphasis within fundamentalism on rigid power and control structures that are pervasive through all dimensions of life is social, cultural and intellectual uniformity that is distinctly uncomfortable with difference.  According to Barr (1980, p. 76), ‘Fundamentalism as a movement has no insight into ways in which it might live along with other Christians who think quite differently, or live alongside people who are not Christians at all.’  It’s not that fundamentalists don’t want to like other people; they just want them to be more like fundamentalists first.

This is an inevitable consequence of the arrogance associated with the conviction that only our group has unadulterated access to absolute truth, moreover divinely revealed truth, and everyone else’s opinion must therefore be secondary - or just plain wrong.  Altemeyer (2003, p. 18) has suggested that ‘The more one goes to church, the more likely one will be prejudiced against a variety of others.’  This is an argument that cannot be sustained against religion generally, but which does have specific relevance to fundamentalism.

Of course, faith-based prejudice isn’t limited to specific denominations or religious expressions.  Once more it’s not so much what we believe that is the problem, but the way we believe it - specifically that only our beliefs are the essential, true and inerrant ones.  Fundamentalist Christians will claim that homosexuality is a sin because the Bible says so.  However, they fail to acknowledge that choosing which parts of the Bible to ignore and which to enforce is largely based on their own pre-existing prejudice.  This is what Barr (1984, p. 123) is pointing out when he says that ‘No one can put all the biblical ethical commands into practice within Christianity and no one even tries to do so.  When it is supposed that an ethical question is settled by the simple existence of a biblical command, it is highly likely that that biblical command has been selected and emphasised because of personal interests and prejudices (italics mine).’ Rigid moral and ethical standards, however corrupted they may be by prejudice, are an essential ingredient in maintaining and binding a strong internal subculture.

Does ‘closing the mind’ always result in violence?

The dangers associated with the fundamentalist ‘closing of the mind’ may not always result in violence but they do create the conditions necessary for violence to occur: strict authoritarian structures; prejudice; demonisation of the ‘other’; abrogation of responsibility to divine will.  Armstrong (2004, p. 876) admits that fundamentalism itself ‘is not necessarily violent; most fundamentalists are simply trying to live an embattled religious life and do not take part it acts of terror.  But when violence becomes endemic in a region, such as the Middle East, religion gets sucked into the dispute’.   Ali (2002, p. 4) has also argued persuasively that it is not religious views alone that create violence, but the real-life circumstances in which those views take hold.  The violence is systemic but finds expression through easy channels like religion and nationalism.   The real danger is that fundamentalist thinking is particularly vulnerable and attractive to extremism and extremism inherently carries the potential for violence.

Some, like Sim(2004, p. 100), have noticed that fundamentalism often demonstrates clearer alliances with politics than with traditional notions of spirituality.  The fundamentalist’s discomfort with dissent combined with an attraction to authoritarian structures reveals a characteristic power dynamic that seeks to gain and maintain power largely through fear.  According to Barr (1984, p. 179), there are no compromises in fundamentalism. ‘You have to accept the entire fundamentalist system, down to every detail.  The system is by its nature tied to extremism.  Any substantial deviation or admission of weakness and, logically, the whole thing must collapse.’  This combination of a will to power with a vulnerability to extremism is highly dangerous.  The fundamentalist strategy of closing the mind, which in itself could be seen as abusive, becomes particularly dangerous when combined with an adversarial attitude ranging from prejudice to divinely condoned violence.

Redeeming Religion in the 21^st Century

After 100 years of fundamentalism, can religion find an alternative expression that is more in harmony with modernity (and with each other)?

Modern fundamentalism has been challenged by an era of rapid change, scientific and technological advance.  Sustainable contemporary expressions of religion will be open to genuine dialogue with science instead of seeing it as an enemy to be defeated.

Probably the greatest challenge to religion in the twenty first century is the challenge of pluralism.  Fundamentalism has demonstrated that it is not possible for any one religion to claim absolute truth without dismissing the claims of all others.  Such competitive attitudes will never allow religions to co-exist peacefully.  However, this is the specific problem of fundamentalism, not necessarily of religion.  Later this year, Melbourne will host a Parliament of the World’s Religions, a periodic gathering that brings together people from all over the world from a wide variety of faith backgrounds.  Rev Dirk Ficca, Executive Director of the Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions spoke about two central themes of the Parliament in an interview on ABC radio earlier this year (Ficca, 2009):
Firstly, they are aiming for harmony rather than unity. The point is not to pretend that all religions are the same or to blend them into a universal, homogenous belief system. Rather, acknowledging and accepting one another’s differences, people of all faiths can learn to live together peacefully and in harmony with one another.

Secondly, trust is more important than agreement.  It’s possible to agree with someone on any number of issues but still be unable to trust them.  Similarly, two people might be deeply divided on subjects of great importance to each of them but maintain a trust that is ultimately more significant than intellectual assent.  These two themes are foundational for the positive co-existence of religions in the twenty-first century and beyond.

Viable contemporary expressions of religion cannot afford to be defined by the authoritarian intolerance of dissent that characterises fundamentalism today.  Farley (2005, p. 20) notes that although all religions are vulnerable to an ‘incipient fundamentalism’, often this is kept in check by a ‘prophetic/transcendent element which creates within religion a space for its own self-criticism.’  It is this self-critical element that will be a vital part of any religious movement that wishes to maintain a legitimate presence into the future.

Every religious tradition must take responsibility for the extremist elements within its own ranks.  Fundamentalisms have been allowed to thrive because they have been tolerated as an alternative ideology without taking seriously their natural predisposition towards prejudice and its associated continuum of violence.

The other vital component for contemporary religion will be a clear mandate for non-violence.  Religions that either explicitly or implicitly encourage, condone or allow violence no longer have any integrity.  People are rightly tired of religious wars and crusades.  This is a point on which all religions must ultimately agree - that no more blood should be shed on account of any God.

Conclusion

This essay began by elucidating three pairs of relationships that have garnered particular attention in the last decade.  A strong and rather militant atheist movement has set up religion as the enemy of reason and faith as the opposite of truth.  At the same time, fundamentalism has tarnished all religions not only with the brush of ignorance, but also with an inherent tendency towards violence.

In reality the New Atheists have often used inadequate definitions characteristic of fundamentalism to attack all religions.  Furthermore, not only are broader conceptions of faith and truth actually more consistent with religious history than modern fundamentalists would concede, they are also more conducive to harmonious co-existence.

The most hardcore fundamentalists might be proud of the title, seeing it as faithful adherence to their most precious religious doctrines.  However the rest of the world is increasingly associating fundamentalists with their actions, particularly with violent protests, with uncompromising moral rigidity, and with a passion for theocracy that results in continual grabbing for power.

Whilst there is a relationship between belief and action, the relationship between fundamentalism and violence is not caused by religious doctrine alone.  As this essay has demonstrated, fundamentalism creates the conditions in which prejudice and violence become expected responses along a continuum that validates extremism as total commitment to a holy cause.

Writer: Captain Jason Davies-Kildea is currently serving as Social Program Secretary in the Melbourne Central Division in Australia. He received a Churchill Fellowship in 2006 and travelled to the US, UK and Kenya to look at “models of holistic service, for highly disadvantaged people, which have been established in faith-based communities”. He recently graduated with a Masters in Theology and writes regularly on his own blog, which you can find here.

Reference List

ALI, T. (2002) The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, London, Verso.

ALTEMEYER, B. (2003) Why Do Religious Fundamentalists Tend to be Prejudiced? International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 13, 17 - 28.

ARMSTRONG, K. (2000) The battle for God, New York, Alfred A. Knopf.

ARMSTRONG, K. (2004) Fundamentalism and the secular society. International Journal, 59, 3.

BARR, J. (1980) The scope and authority of the Bible, London, SCM press.

BARR, J. (1984) Escaping from fundamentalism, London, SCM Press Ltd.

BRUCE, S. (2008) Fundamentalism, Cambridge, UK, Polity.

CAMERON, P. (1995) Fundamentalism and freedom, Sydney, Doubleday.

DAWKINS, R. (2006) The God delusion, London, Bantam Press.

ELLENS, J. H. (Ed.) (2004) The Destructive Power of Religion. Violence in Judaism, Christianity and Islam., London, Praeger.

FARLEY, E. (2005) Fundamentalism. A Theory. Crosscurrents, 25.

FICCA, D. (2009) Comings and Goings. Melbourne, ABC.

GOULD, S. J., MCGARR, P. & ROSE, S. P. R. (2007) The richness of life : the essential Stephen Jay Gould, New York, W.W. Norton.

GUBA, E. G. & LINCOLN, Y. S. (1998) Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. IN DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. (Eds.) The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications.

MEYERS, R. R. (2006) Why the Christian right is wrong : a minister’s manifesto for taking back your faith, your flag, your future, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass.

SIM, S. (2004) Fundamentalist World: The New Dark Age of Dogma, Cambridge, Icon Books.

TILLICH, P. (1955) Biblical religion and the search for ultimate reality, [Chicago], University of Chicago Press.

VORSTER, J. M. (2007) Analytical Perspectives on Religious Fundamentalism. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 17, 16.

VORSTER, J. M. (2008) Perspectives on the Core Characteristics of Religious Fundamentalism Today. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 7, 21.

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[1] Though it has been noted that polytheistic religions may be somewhat more resilient to fundamentalisms because their diversity requires an inherent tolerance for alternative beliefs.  BRUCE, S. (2008) Fundamentalism, Cambridge, UK, Polity. P.5

[2] Vorster notes that ‘Islam, Judaism and Protestant Christianity seem more prone to fundamentalism than other religions because they are ‘religions of the book” VORSTER, J. M. (2007) Analytical Perspectives on Religious Fundamentalism. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 17, 16. p.8

[3] Such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris or Christopher Hitchens

[4] Admittedly, Galileo was condemned by the church of his time for suggesting that the Earth rotated around the Sun and not vice versa.

[5] Interestingly, the term epistemology comes from the same Greek root as the word faith (epistamai, pisteuw).

5 Comments to Religion, Faith, Fundamentalism

1. According to Cameron (1995, pp. 7,9), fundamentalism’s defining characteristics include ‘hostility to freedom, truth, and dissent; and an insistence on authority, obedience, conformity, and indoctrination.’

   Can you think of any Christian denomination that has much emphasis on authority, obedience, conformity and indoctrination ?

   Hints

   authority - a quasi-military structure
   obedience - the founder required complete obedience to authority
   conformity - positional statements that everyone in the organisation must agree with
   indoctrination - senior soldiership?
John Duthie on August 27th, 2009

2. Barr said, “No one can put all the biblical ethical commands into practice within Christianity and no one even tries to do so….”

   Why is this so?

   You appear to justify your brand of scriptural cherry picking by appealing to the Wesleyan Quadrilateral. How do you respond to Calvinists and others who may not accept Wesley’s method of scriptural interpretation?

   SA doctrine #1 says that “the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments were given by inspiration of God and…they only constitute the Divine rule of Christian faith and practice.”

   This doctrine doesn’t appear to leave any room for cherry picking. How do you square the stated doctrine with what you seem to admit is the actual practice?
the chaplain on August 28th, 2009

3. This is a very good essay: accurate, comprehensive, erudite, and well written. You provide plenty of food for thought and your conclusions are sound. One of the key points a reader will glean is that religious fundamentalism has caused, and will continue to cause, a great deal of suffering. As time moves forward, some religions are adopting more tolerant perspectives; in this case, I refer to attitudes towards homosexuality. One can hope that, ever so gradually, heated rhetoric and narrow-mindedness are giving way to reason and acceptance of variant lifestyles. This is another way of saying that fundamentalism, meaning extremism, is fading away. In all likelihood, there will forever be a hateful fringe, but overall it appears we are making real progress - albeit slowly. Yet at this juncture, a large segment of society, mostly fueled by the religious right, still regards gay men and women as second-class citizens - or worse. That is the salient point of my recently released biographical novel, Broken Saint. It is based on my forty-year friendship with a gay man, and chronicles his internal and external struggles as he battles for acceptance. More information on the book is available at http://www.eloquentbooks.com/BrokenSaint.html.

   Mark Zamen, author
Mark Zamen on August 28th, 2009

4. Thanks for the comments so far. I have just a couple of responses:

   Firstly, though I agree to some extent that The Salvation Army’s heirarchical military structure does make us vulnerable to some of the excesses of fundamentalism. However, I also think that our salvation lies in the movement’s social commitment which anchors us in this reality, keeping fanaticism and extremism in tension.

   Secondly, I’m unclear as to what the ’scriptural cherry picking’ refers to as I can’t remember making any scriptural references. This also invalidate the supposition that I am using the Wesleyan Quadrilateral. Unlike most of my previous writing, which has a clear theological bent, the purpose of this piece is substantially sociological and therefore appeals to scripture as a basis for argument are irrelevant.

   Grace and Peace, JDK
Jason Davies-Kildea on August 29th, 2009

5. Hi Jason,

   Thanks for the article. It took me a while to get through it (not been too well). You make a lot of really good points which I also agree with.

   Additionally, for me, the problem with fundamentalism is its’ refusal to accept new understanding and incorporate new evidence into it’s theology. For example:

   1) We now have a much better understanding of ancient languages than we did even a few decades ago. Hence, when we ‘re-translate’ the scripture in light of our increased knowledge of the ancient languages and society, we realise that much of what we ‘thought’ the bible says, it doesn’t say at all. This will dramatically change our theology and ministry to people. A clasic example is the ‘teaching’ on homosexuality. When we re-translate the Bible with an increased knowledge of ancient languages, we find the Bible says NOTHING against homosexuality, and may even support same-sex relationships that are monogomous etc. Surely, if we claim to follow the teaching of the Bible, we need to accept this as this appears to be what the Bible says. But fundamentalism refuses to accept it, prefering to put it’s own canon above scripture and making a dead religion out of the living word.

   2) Similarity of other ancient stories. The more archeology we do, the more historical research we do, the more we realise that many of the themes and stories in the Bible are not unique. For example, the theme/story of a virgin birth, the son of the king of the gods, who challenged the existing understanding of worshiping god, who dove into the depths of the underworld and defeated the ruler of the underworld and set free all its’ inhabitants, and rose to sit at the right hand of his father, is a common theme in other ancient religions - most famously in ancient Greek mythology at least 500 years before Christ.

   3) Increases in scientific knowledge. There are countless examples of how science has incresaed our knowledge of our world, and in many cases, has fundamentally challenged the beliefs of fundamental religion in doing so. By being so inflexible and maintaining theology and their interpretation of scripture to be above all else, it really makes them out to be a laughing stock.

   My concern is how powerful fundamentalists are, and how much they have permeated all avenues of society and the destruction they cause as a result. It is also equally a concern how fundamentalists prevent the message of the gospel from being preached to all people. All they present is their own twisted message of hate which teaches hate is love, and love is evil (that is the bottom line in all fundamentalist teachings - including fundamentalist Christianity).

   We need to strongly and aggressively fight against fundamentalism. If fundamentalists want to set up their own churches with their own gods, then let them. As for me, I will worship God, however He/She/It is revealed to me. Knowing that my feeble mind cannot possibly comprehend such a great and powerful God. Knowing that my understanding of that God will constantly change, along with my theology, as I grow and learn more about my God.

   Yours in Christ,
   Graeme.
Graeme Randall on September 6th, 2009

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